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Mirror neurons, firing when an action
is performed but also when the same
action is perceived, have been the source
of both excitement and controversy since
their discovery (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992).
One key to this polarization of opin-
ion is the claim that mirror neurons
are involved in “action understanding”
(Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010). As we have recently
discussed (Cook et al., 2014), the term
“action understanding” has not been
clearly defined, and has been used to refer
to various different psychological pro-
cesses, including action perception (Saygin
et al., 2004); identification of the goal of
an action (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro,
2008); and the computation of an actor’s
intentions in a particular context (Fogassi
et al., 2005). This has contributed to con-
fusion around what role, if any, mirror
neurons may play in social interaction.
Data on the contribution of mirror
neurons—or mirror neuron brain areas,
in particular premotor cortex—to a psy-
chological process that might possibly
correspond to “action understanding” are
relatively sparse. Some, but not all, patient
data indicate that action perception may
require mirror neuron areas (Saygin, 2007;
Moro et al., 2008; but Arévalo et al.,
2012, provide an alternative view; note also
that the understanding of action language
appears to require the basal ganglia, rather
than somatotopically organized motor
areas: Ibáñez et al., 2013). Transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) of premo-
tor cortex disrupts aspects of action per-
ception including visual discrimination of
actions (Candidi et al., 2008), configural
processing of bodies (Urgesi et al., 2007)
and judgment of body esthetics (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2010). It also impairs the
ability to use information from perceived
actions to judge the weight of grasped
objects (Pobric and Hamilton, 2006) and
to initiate on-line predictions about ongo-
ing actions (Stadler et al., 2012). Thus,
there is some evidence for a mirror neuron
contribution to action perception, but little
to support their involvement in a higher-
level process of “action understanding”
(see also Mikulan et al., 2014).
Therefore, Michael et al. (2014)
addressed the twin questions of whether
mirror neuron areas are involved in a
process that might be termed “action
understanding,” and whether this pro-
cess corresponds to action perception or
to something more akin to goal iden-
tification or computation of intentions.
Using disruptive TMS to premotor cortex,
they demonstrated that performance on
an action processing task was affected in
a body-part-specific way. Thus, disrup-
tion of a more dorsal part of premotor
cortex, thought to correspond to an area
involved in control of hand movements,
impaired processing of observed hand, but
not mouth actions; whereas disruption of
a more ventral area, thought to control
mouth movements, impaired processing
of mouth, but not hand, actions. This
result complements the existing literature
by demonstrating not only that premotor
cortex is involved in processing of oth-
ers’ actions, but that its involvement may
be at the level of the motor program of
particular body parts.
More interestingly, however, Michael
et al. measured the processing of oth-
ers’ actions in three different ways. In all
three tasks, participants saw a contextual
cue, then watched a video of an action
of the hand or mouth. Their task was to
judge which of three subsequent probe
items matched the action video they had
observed. The “simple” task tested action
perception: participants had only to per-
ceive the action video and make a delayed
match to sample judgment. The “inter-
mediate” task tested both action percep-
tion and the ability to match an action
to its goal object. Finally, the “complex”
task tested action perception, the ability to
match an action to its goal object, and the
ability to select a context-appropriate goal
object. It is apparent that the simple task
requires only action perception, not action
understanding, whereas the other tasks
involve higher-level processes in addition
to action perception. If premotor cortex
is involved in higher-level processes of
action understanding then the intermedi-
ate and/or complex tasks should be more
impaired by TMS than the simple task.
TMS to premotor cortex impaired par-
ticipants’ performance, in a body-part
specific way, on all three tasks, but cru-
cially, there were no significant differences
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between tasks. Recall that all three tasks
required action perception: since perfor-
mance on all three tasks was impaired,
these data suggest that mirror neuron
areas are involved, not in higher-level pro-
cesses such as matching an action to its
goal object or selecting the relevant object
for that action in a given context, but
instead in a lower-level process of action
perception. Michael et al. describe their
results as demonstrating the role of mirror
neuron areas in “action understanding”;
instead, however, these data support the
claim that premotor cortex may contribute
to the perception of others’ actions.
It does not appear, therefore, that
these data are in contradiction with
what Michael et al. term a “deflationary”
account of mirror neuron properties: the
suggestion that mirror neuron responses
during action observation are the result of
sensorimotor associations. If mirror neu-
rons are the result of bidirectional associ-
ations between sensory and motor repre-
sentations of actions (Heyes, 2001, 2010),
this does not rule out the possibility that
they may play a role in action perception
(Cook et al., 2014). However, one relevant
implication of the associative account for
Michael et al.’s results is that TMS-induced
disruption to motor representations of a
particular body part might propagate, via
such sensorimotor associations, to sensory
representations of that body part, produc-
ing the observed impairments in action
perception. A useful next step would
be to combine TMS with neuroimag-
ing, to reveal the brain networks affected
by TMS in this study, and in particular
whether premotor TMS influences sensory
areas.
In conclusion, these data do not con-
vincingly support the claim that mirror
neurons are involved in high-level “action
understanding”; if anything, they contra-
dict this claim. However, they do demon-
strate that premotor cortex may, in some
circumstances, contribute to action per-
ception. Future studies testing mirror neu-
ron contributions to action understanding
must therefore control for premotor con-
tributions to action perception, as well as
providing a clearer definition of what is
meant by “action understanding.”
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